TBH this seems to vary a fair bit with events on the ground, so it's hard to draw firm conclusions (esp. from one poll)
Figure (5): Voting intentions before and after the May 2021 war between Hamas and Israel (PCPSR’s polls # 79, March 2021 and # 80, June 2021)

If the Ramallah based [PC]PSR is to be believed, Hamas surged from around 30% to 40% popularity after the 2021 fighting, while the opposite happened to Fatah's popularity.
They have a lot more polls with the keyword 'Hamas' if someone feels like diving into deeper. Some of it is not too reassuring, e.g. in 2014
79% believe[d] that Hamas has won the Gaza War. [...] 49% think it is justified for Hamas to launch rockets from populated areas and 46% disagree with that.
And from late 2021
Fatah is more popular than Hamas (38% to 30%) in West Bank cities which will participate in the second phase of local elections while Hamas is more popular than Fatah (47% to 29%) in the cities in the Gaza Strip that might participate in the second phase of local elections.
So overall analysis of Palestinians (as in the PCPO poll from the other answer) might not be too conclusive wrt to Gaza's population.
As for PA's authority... I get a totally different vibe from a May 2023 poll by PSR:
Armed escalation and a third intifada:
- 71% support the formation of armed groups
- 86% say the PA does not have the right to arrest members of these armed groups
71% of the public (79% in the Gaza Strip and 66% in the West Bank) say they are in favor of forming armed groups such as the “Lions’ Den” and the “Jenin Battalion,” which do not take orders from the PA and are not part of the PA security services;
So, I'm pretty skeptical people support PA that much. It might be context-dependent.
This is the same pollster on the ground (PSR) but contracted by the Western (mostly Princeton-based) Arab Barometer, with more pointed questions about Hamas governing:


Alas the date of the poll is not exactly clear, besides the year.
Overall, the survey responses indicate that Gazans desire political change.
In an eight-point decline since 2021, just 26 percent said the government
was very (three percent) or largely (23 percent) responsive to the needs of
the people. When asked what is the most effective way for ordinary people
to influence the government, a plurality said “nothing is effective.” The
next most popular answer was to use personal connections to reach a
government official. Most Gazans saw no avenue for publicly expressing
their grievances with the Hamas-led government. Only 40 percent said
that freedom of expression was guaranteed to a great or moderate extent,
and 68 percent believed that the right to participate in a peaceful protest
was not protected or was protected only to a limited extent under Hamas
rule.
This poll even finds that Fatah has [marginally] more support in Gaza than Hamas (no margin of error is reported though):

[...] Given the low opinion most Gazans hold of their government, it is
unsurprising that their disapproval extends to Hamas as a political party.
Just 27 percent of respondents selected Hamas as their preferred party,
slightly less than the proportion who favored Fatah (30 percent), the party
that is led by Abbas and that governs the West Bank. Hamas’s popularity
in Gaza has slipped as well, falling from 34 percent support in the 2021
survey. There is notable demographic variation in the recent responses,
too. Thirty-three percent of adults under 30 expressed support for Hamas,
compared with 23 percent of those 30 and older. And poorer Gazans were
less likely than their wealthier counterparts to support Hamas. Among
those who cannot cover their basic expenses, just 25 percent favored the
party in power. Among those who can, the figure rose to 33 percent. The
fact that the people most affected by dire economic conditions and those
who remember life before Hamas rule were more likely to reject the party
underlines the limits of Gazans’ support for Hamas’s movement.
There are some new numbers posted by WaPo on Dec 25. Some might be shocked, but this war had a similar effect as some past ones. Hamas' popularity increased, and that of the PA decreased:
Some 88 percent of Palestinians want Abbas to resign, the poll indicated, up 10 points from three months ago. The popularity of Hamas in the West Bank, meanwhile, has soared from 12 percent to 44 percent, wile also rising slightly in Gaza.
Alas, I wasn't able to quickly find more details on that poll.
I suppose it might be this PCPSR poll from late Nov which reported similar results:
Support for Hamas has more than tripled in the West Bank compared to three months ago. In the Gaza Strip, support for Hamas increased but not significantly. Despite the increase in its popularity, the majority in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip does not support Hamas. It is worth noting that support for Hamas usually rises temporarily during or immediately after a war and then returns to the previous level several months after the end of the war.
Support for President Mahmoud Abbas and his Fateh party drops significantly. The same is true for the trust in the PA as a whole, as demand for its dissolution rises to nearly 60%, the highest percentage ever recorded in PSR polls. Demand for Abbas's resignation is rising to around 90 percent, and even higher in the West Bank. Despite the decline in support for Fatah and Abbas, the most popular Palestinian figure remains Marwan Barghouti, a Fatah leader. Barghouti is still able to beat Hamas’ candidate Ismail Haniyeh or any other.
Another interesting point there, perhaps:
While the vast majority of West Bankers (70%) thinks Hamas will emerge victorious in this war, only half of Gazans think the same.
Also, that notion of victory is slightly different from retaining power
72% (80% in the West Bank and 61% in the Gaza Strip) think Hamas will succeed in returning to rule over the Gaza Strip after the war despite Israel’s declared objective of eradicating that organization.