-3

After the Russo-Ukrainian war ends, what is the probability for Russia, or territories from former Russia, to re-integrate with the West (e.g. pre-Russian Revolution) and what steps would be necessary to achieve it?

This will assume 2 scenarios: one where Russia exists as coherent state after the war (however the war ends, such as total victory, negotiation annd treaty, ceasefire, etc.) and the opposite where Russia become a rump state or many states (e.g. total defeat, civil war, ceasefire and negotiation).

uberhaxed
  • 2,490
  • 10
  • 24
Smer5
  • 37
  • 2
  • 9
    When was Russia integrated into the West? – ceejayoz Oct 19 '22 at 01:57
  • @ceejayoz One could argue the Gorbachev and Yeltsin era were a time of optimism for international relation. While Russia was in turmoil internally, it was integrating into the rule-based world order externally. We look at Putin today and think he is ineveitable but there was a time when that's not the case. – QuantumWalnut Oct 19 '22 at 03:40
  • @ceejayoz russian liberals says it also "sort of started" in 90-s, however i have feeling that in history of ussr and 90-s russia was never (emm, first in such dirty war state) in such distance from the West, yes even in soviet times. The bunker rat have made it really extreme, however we see not that his days are counted – Smer5 Oct 19 '22 at 03:45
  • 1
    As is this question is a speculative yes/no question which is not very useful. Maybe try to ask a bit different. Like what structures would integrate Russia in the West or why Russia hasn't itself/been integrated so far. From that we should learn something. For the current question I'd just say: yes but it's a long way to go. In principle Russia simply has to follow Ukraine. – NoDataDumpNoContribution Oct 19 '22 at 05:46
  • 2
    @ceejayoz before 1917 – kandi Oct 19 '22 at 07:43
  • 7
    Please define "integration into the West" - it does not make any sense to me. What is "integration"? What is "West"? Please give an example of a previous integration, in order to understand better what "re-integration" means in the context of the question, too. – virolino Oct 19 '22 at 09:38
  • 2
    My english is not really good, but as far I understand re-integration means that the country was already integrated befor which was never the case. – convert Oct 19 '22 at 10:43
  • 1
    @convert: the problem here is not about English. We need to understand what OP really wants to ask. It is useless to start guessing. – virolino Oct 19 '22 at 12:36
  • In this context this question could be of interest: https://politics.stackexchange.com/q/10960/41763 – convert Oct 19 '22 at 12:39
  • Russia was making good progress under Gorbachev re: "integration into the West" (for some values of integration and west). When his term ended, though, his reforms pretty well ended too. – JamieB Oct 19 '22 at 21:31
  • 1
    @JamieB Gorbachev was president of USSR not Russia. Are you posibly tallking about Yelzin? – convert Oct 20 '22 at 11:10

3 Answers3

6

It's not a question of possibility, but rather probability.

In theory, of course it's possible for Russia to re-integrate into a rule-based world order. But it is contingent on several factors:

  1. Succession principle: Russia currently does not have a stable succession principle, which means Putin's death will lead to a bloody and violent power struggle. Whoever emerges as the next leader will be a dictator, and the cycle continues. Russia cannot break free from this cycle until it develops a stable, democratic succession principle. It's not clear how it can get to that point given where we are now.

  2. Corruption: Corruption is a feature, not a bug in the Russian system. This means that a democratic transition will be difficult since Russia has to rebuild its administration from scratch. The Yeltsin years was marked with disappointment towards democracy due to mismanagement and internal chaos. If people get fed up with democracy they will revert back to authoritarian rule again just as they did with Putin. Whoever becomes Russia's democratic leader has their work cut out, and it's not clear whether they can even succeed.

  3. Renewable energy transition: Russia's current economy relies heavily on gas export, which means stopping gas extraction will spell economic collapse. This is critical because if Russia is to re-integrate into rule-based world order, it has to be a democracy, but to be a demcoracy means facing the hard question of climate change and energy transition. It's not clear at all whether even a demcocratic Russia has the ability to make this leap, the easier path may just be going back to the authoritarian model and sedate your population with propaganda detached from reality.

The most consequential thing that the European Union did recently is cutting itself from Russian gas. While it has manifested in the form of a painful cost-of-living crisis, it is backing Russia into an existential corner, and creating the necessary condition for Russia to consider democratic transition.

Once Russia no longer has an easy revenue stream from fossil fuel, it would be forced to turn to its own people as a source of revenue (i.e. taxes). But to tax your people you need a functional administration / economy, and to do that you need to reduce corruption, and to do that you need a more decentralized power structure (i.e. something that resembles democracy).

The truth is empires don't transition to democracy until they have to. It's entirely possible that Russia could come out of the Ukraine experience and think the problem is not that emprie is untenable, but that they just don't have enough empire (they've arrived at this juncture many times). We just have to wait and see.

QuantumWalnut
  • 10,417
  • 30
  • 74
  • 3
    Mostly agreed, but Russia might sell gas and oil to the East (China, possibly India) and only then try to integrate with the "global rules-based order." – o.m. Oct 19 '22 at 04:36
  • 6
    I'd say that Russia wanting to integrate with the "global rules-based order" is the reason of the quagmire we're in. After all, the "global rules" can be simplified in "global superpowers make and bend the rules". It's clear that Russia still sees itself as a global superpower, and so, if Russia wants to invade Ukraine or the USA wants to invade Irak or Afghanistan, they should be able to do it. Pretending that we are "the good" and the other side is "the evil" is an exercise of maniqueism most of the world is not buying (hence they are not joining to the sanctions to Russia). – Rekesoft Oct 19 '22 at 08:08
  • 2
    Petroleum Gas was just 6% of Russian exports in 2020. Russian economy does not depend on it to function. Buyers' economies might. It's same with wheat, whose absence may spell regime change in some buyers' countries but it's just 3% of actual Russian exports. – alamar Oct 19 '22 at 08:14
  • 2
    @Rekesoft I reject your premise that imperial power struggle is "rule-based" in any sense of the word. The entire premise of rule-based order is that democratic countries make the rules (by law or treaty) and they respect the rules regardless of military power differential. When one party violates this norm, they are to be resisted regardless it's US or Russia. To suggest that this norm is not worth defending in the first place and that complacency is a valid option is both naive and lazy. – QuantumWalnut Oct 19 '22 at 08:24
  • 2
    @QuantumWalnut This norm would be very well worth defending, I wholly agree... if it actually existed anywhere but your mind. Countries, democratic or not, can make laws. They only affect their own citizens. Countries, democratic or not, can make treaties with other countries. They tend to respect the terms of the agreement, unless they don't. When one party violates this norm, the possible answers go from "doing nothing" to "go to war" through several middle terms like "go to an international arbiter". The action chosen and the final results depend from case to case [cont] – Rekesoft Oct 19 '22 at 09:01
  • 2
    @QuantumWalnut There are different reasons which determine which action is chosen: how much we can lose (in economical or political terms), how much does that action cost , what we can expect to win. Powerful countries can take more risks than weak countries. The USA has unilaterally denounced several treaties without that much consequence, because what are you gonna do about it? – Rekesoft Oct 19 '22 at 09:10
3

Many scenarios are possible.

  • Failed military adventurism leads to a genuine revolution in Russia. The new regime may be unstable, but the West would be bound to support it by dropping sanctions.
  • Amid mutual exhaustion, Ukraine and Russia could come to a compromise which saves some face on both sides (e.g. Ukraine accepts the loss of the Crimea in return for Russian acceptance of Ukrainian sovereignty over the remaining territory). As part of the deal, sanctions fall. The West would still not trust Russia, but there would be businesses dealing with Russia under President Putin.
  • With Western logistics, Ukraine wins a conventional victory and liberates all of their territory. Either Russia does not go nuclear, or it does but this doesn't change the military situation. The West threatens to withdraw their support if Ukraine counterattacks into recognized Russian territory. Combat winds down, the situation becomes a formal or informal armistice, and after a few years sanctions start to crumble as Europe still needs some fossil fuel. (Perhaps a crisis in the Middle East, in a mirror of how some Arab regimes got embraced despite the political problems while Russia looked even worse to the West?)
  • As above, but there is a change of government in Russia. The new government may be no less nationalist than the old one, but it sentences some scapegoats. (More for failing a war of aggression than for starting one?) The West wants the oil price to go down and drops sanctions.
  • In a few months, gas runs short in much of Europe. Ugly political infighting. Some of the countries which complained about German dependence have even less reserve capacity, and might need Russian gas from German tanks sooner or later. Electorates turn nationalist. A bunch of governments fall, get replaced by new majorities willing to abandon Ukraine as long as Russia opens the taps.
    Here is a link to gas storage levels, which average at 92% full as of 2022-OCT-19. But look at the percentage of annual use, instead.

So the necessary steps, for Russia, differ depending on the scenario. President Putin would prefer the last one. The West might prefer the first one, if it isn't too unstable.

Note the differences to the answer by QuantumWalnut. I'm a bit more cynical about the willingness of the West to cut deals with autocrats, as long as those autocrats don't upset the apple cart.

o.m.
  • 108,520
  • 19
  • 265
  • 393
-2

There are no such things as hate or revenge at international level. The only thing that may happen is Russia may need to assist rebuilding that they have destroyed in Ukraine.

Otherwise if to propose the agreement featuring return to the state preceding the occupation of Crimea and other territories (yet no NATO for Ukraine), this would definitely be discussed and likely to be accepted.

It is a Russian PR narrative that EU seeks to destroy Russia as a country. Such a "destroyed country" with chaos inside (gangs, refugees, terrorism, new dictator emerging) is a security nightmare nobody wants nearby. It is possible to agree with the narrative that such an end is not preferred so EU will likely try to avoid it.

Novaya Gazeta Europe thinks that the next Russian president will be forced to end the war, regardless how pro-Russian he might be.

Stančikas
  • 21,514
  • 1
  • 52
  • 113
  • 4
    "Such a "destroyed country" with chaos inside (gangs, refugees, terrorism, new dictator emerging) is a security nightmare nobody wants nearby." There are statements from people from the West who wants that. – convert Oct 19 '22 at 11:48
  • 2
    There'd also a lot of statements from "Russian opposition" (in exile, likely paid by western NGOs) who want precisely that. – alamar Oct 19 '22 at 12:09
  • 2
    There are no such things as hate or revenge at international level. Demonstrably false in the general sense of intra-European dislikes that brought about WW1. For example, France hated Germany and wanted revenge for losing Alsace-Lorraine but all sorts of other dislikes were at play. A good deal of European wars probably can be explained by exactly those 2 things and that's why European countries went out of their way to set up the EU and its predecessor https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Coal_and_Steel_Community – Italian Philosophers 4 Monica Oct 19 '22 at 20:55
  • There are no such things as hate or revenge at international level

    Incorrect. Nations may be abstract concepts, but those who speak for a nation and define its policies are still people -- and, in democratic governances, are people who are beholden to more people. If national leaders could be relied upon to always make the rational and optimal decision for the good of their respective nations this entire substack would be unnecessary.

     – Shadur-don't-feed-the-AI Oct 20 '22 at 09:01
  • Even if you call EU and USA press a complete propaganda that I would question, I have never seen any single article in my press that would advocate to invade or destroy Russia or that they need anything from it. It may be some fringe groups somewhere in the Facebook but definitely not the primary narrative. – Stančikas Oct 20 '22 at 09:46
  • @Stančikas Then how do you call this or this? "Decolonizing" really means dissolution of Russia which in simple language basically means destroying Russia. And I didn't even bother to dig deep, I just took first few results from Wikipedia. – dosvarog Oct 31 '22 at 14:29
  • If you do not physically destroy the population, you need to do something else so that these people could live somehow and not by forming the second ISIS in your neighbourhood. A normal and stable country still looks to me the most reliable solution. Fringe groups and radical views do exist. – Stančikas Oct 31 '22 at 17:00