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The logic goes like this: since both sides know, and they know that the other side also knows, the game theory conclusion for Russia to have any chance of something other than defeat is to massively attack with nuclear weapons the moment enough NATO countries demonstrate they are seriously committed to fighting and enough forces are assembled.

Since it’s understood that the Russian armed forces can’t possibly win an exclusively conventional battle if NATO commits, as the industrial capacity of North America + Europe is so much greater.

Although obviously the losses would be horrendous, with less than a fifth of the population, a 5 or 6 to 1 exchange in favour of Russia would cause vastly asymmetric damage. Thus giving a ‘relative victory’ to Russia, which may be perceived as better than a conventional loss.

This then produces the paradox that the more committed the NATO countries are to fighting, the less safe they become. And the more resources spent on their military, the less safe they become, as the conventional gap grows wider.

Whereas conversely the stronger and more confident Russia becomes conventionally, the lower the chance of them resorting to rapid nuclear escalation, thus making the world safer. (assuming nuclear forces remain constant on both sides)

In economic terms, every extra dollar of wealth generated, and every extra bit of productivity by the NATO countries above and beyond what Russia can produce, actually makes everyone less safe as they decrease the confidence that Russia can resist a conventional loss.

It sounds totally bizarre, is there a better interpretation?

M. Y. Zuo
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    Leaving aside some major doubts about the premise, which actually distract from the very interesting question: It is the classic cold war dilemma. That's why we used to have arms control, until our NeoCon friends in DC decided they knew better, starting with the Bush-II administration and continuing to return to 1950s mentality ever since. At the same time, it had been observed that peacetime military spending is as much about business as strategy. – Pete W Jan 02 '22 at 15:46
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    How is a mutual nuclear destruction better for Russia than a loss in a convential war? In the first case there is no more Russia afterwards, in the second there is. – quarague Jan 02 '22 at 16:38
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    @quarague - I think the idea is you work up to it in steps, slowly raising and re-raising the stakes with use of tactical nukes... – Pete W Jan 02 '22 at 17:32
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    Modern conventional warfare is about a lot more than numbers of troops and weapons, it is largely about national commitment in terms of capital, both monetary and political. This is a much more complicated calculation than just comparing troop/weapons strength. – RBarryYoung Jan 02 '22 at 18:23
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    This assumes that NATO will commit, rather than individual countries refusing to commit troops or surrendering immediately. – Valorum Jan 02 '22 at 20:00
  • It forces them to escalate to nuclear to have any chance ... of what, when, where? a) Of surviving a full-scale invasion? Yeah, maybe (nukes may not do much good against the forces already in your country, but you can attack their country). That's the whole idea of a nuclear deterrent. b) Of winning any random skirmish elsewhere? Well, no, launching nukes for that would greatly increase the risk of all-out global nuclear war, which won't be good for anyone. – NotThatGuy Jan 02 '22 at 22:39
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    What do you think "beating" Russia means? Unless and until you define that, you're only going to get meaningless generalities in your answers. Wars are fought to achieve some objective, and it is exceedingly unlikely that NATO would pursue an unconditional surrender in the first place. – fectin Jan 03 '22 at 16:40
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    Let's start with questions about the premise. I see "everyone knows" as an appeal to prejudice: (1) which "everyone"? (1a) Given 7..8 billion people on the planet; which ones did the OP check with (likely closer to 7..8)? (1b) How was the translation managed (surely 1+ Russians were consulted)? (2) What if this "everyone" is missing vital information about Russia's weapon systems? (3) What if the Russian officials are: (3a) otherwise informed, (3b) otherwise motivated than the general welfare, (3c) subject to neurological 'events', (4) factors we've not considered? – Technophile Jan 04 '22 at 00:29
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    Related: Would defense based only on nuclear weapons work? and the answers to that were generally in the negative with the highest rated answer citing "salami tactics", the risk of the nuke-only country repeatedly being gamed by staying just sort of it's go-nuclear threshold and losing, slice by slice. – Italian Philosophers 4 Monica Jan 04 '22 at 16:10
  • Losing a nuclear war would be much worse for Russia than losing a conventional-based invasion of Ukraine. I doubt that Putin regards Ukraine as being worth that (but he also probably thinks that NATO won't do that either). – RBarryYoung Jan 05 '22 at 15:08
  • To Everyone: Thanks for writing so many comments and replies, some of which were really quite thought provoking, they made me reconsider the premise. Sorry for not updating and replying sooner, I figured it would be better to wait until the dust settled on the then latent tensions, little did I know… However since recents events seemed to have overtaken our discussions I will leave the original up for posterity. – M. Y. Zuo May 01 '22 at 00:22
  • @fectin In regards to my use of the word ‘beating’ it would probably be most charitable to assume that Russian decision makers are not omnicidal maniacs but at the very least are willing to obliterate any hostile force crossing their border and vice versa. The resulting effect on any country having a regiment+ sized force obliterated will very likely lead to an escalatory spiral. Thus ‘beating’ to decision makers would likely mean to have destroyed the will to fight, individually and collectively, of any countries that had sent such forces across the border. i.e. who gives up first is ‘beaten’ – M. Y. Zuo May 01 '22 at 00:29
  • IIRC, one of Andrei Sakharov's big ideas was that it was dangerous for either side of the Cold War to cut back its conventional forces, because it created an increased temptation for the side that had done it to go nuclear. – Daniel Hatton Oct 19 '22 at 13:01

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Russia might also be convinced that NATO lacks the political coherence and will to fight, and that going nuclear would be a "Pearl Harbor moment" which turns it into a fight-to-the-finish. Russian tourists helping a separatists movement in the near abroad are one thing, nuclear weapons are something else. The term to read about is Hybrid Warfare.

My personal estimate is that MAD still stands, even if Russia professes to be worried about growing American missile defenses. And the Russian investment in hypersonics suggests that Russia is serious, not just making propaganda noises. Which brings up the stability-instability paradox: as long as MAD stands, minor conflicts won't go major, so minor conflicts can be risked.

Another interesting question is how long a conflict would last. An American think tank believes that Russia could overrun the Baltics in 60 hours. NATO has deployed tripwire forces in the Baltics, they can't stop Russia but they would make it a fight with a dozen NATO member states.

Compare the Western reassurances for Ukraine, which are far less robust. Biden all but admitted that they won't send troops, only arms and sanctions. Those sanctions are going to be interesting -- if the US bans Russia from SWIFT, will that stop the Russian sale of gas to Europe? With the Nord Stream pipeline system, they could still deliver gas even if Ukraine stops transit (or of the infrastructure in Ukraine is damaged). Then-President Trump complained that Nord Stream 2 increases the European dependence on Russian gas. It doesn't. It decreases Russian and European dependence on Ukraine for the gas transport.

o.m.
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  • Thanks for sharing. It seems that India and Pakistan has behaved along the lines of the expected outcome of the stability-instability paradox. If Pakistan could and continue to deter India even over a core interest like Kashmir, it does seem like Russia will eventually accomplish their objectives too by keeping any conflict below the critical threshold. – M. Y. Zuo Jan 02 '22 at 18:08
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    @M.Y.Zuo, that's not certain. I see two key problems: the Russian leadership believes that the West wants to forment a colour revolution in Russia, and Russia does not accept that the countries on the border of a great power (like them) are free to apply to whichever alliance they want to. This has nothing to do with the number of missiles, and everything with perceptions of political threats. – o.m. Jan 02 '22 at 18:42
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    @o.m. It is not just that Russia doesn't want OTAN on it's doorstep (why would they, we saw how USA reacted with missiles on their doorstep in 1962), but there is probably a legal reason why Ukraine cannot join any military alliance, not just OTAN. This Declaration is the basis for this Act on which Ukrainian Constitution is based. In Declaration, in point 9 it clearly says "that Ukraine will not take part in any military block". And Constitution is based on that Declaration through Act. – dosvarog Jan 02 '22 at 19:09
  • @o.m. You could nullify all those documents, which would also nullify Constitution, but I don't think that would be a good idea.

    I am really amazed why this "little" fact isn't mentioned more, especially in western media.

     – dosvarog Jan 02 '22 at 19:09
  • Per the last paragraph, UK Defence Secretary said the same thing. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/dec/18/uk-unlikely-to-send-troops-if-russia-invades-ukraine-says-defence-secretary – Jontia Jan 02 '22 at 20:18
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    @dosvarog, according to NATO it is the Ukraine (and not Russia) which decides about making the application, and NATO (and not Russia) which decides about accepting it. Those are two distinct decisions. What the constitutional requirements in the Ukraine are is for Ukrainian courts. It might also enter the judgement of NATO when NATO looks at the application. Russia has no legal standing to sue (but they could certainly find Ukrainians to do it for them, in Ukrainian courts). – o.m. Jan 03 '22 at 05:19
  • "Nord Stream 2 increases the European dependence on Russian gas... It doesn't." Of course, it does not increase the dependency (Europe can hardly be more dependend on Russian gas) but it re-emphasises a dependency which has often been negatively criticised over the past 20 years. – rexkogitans Jan 03 '22 at 10:53
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    @rexkogitans Nord Stream 2 increases the European dependency on Russian gas in the sense that it increases the gas supply, bringing prices down, therefore disincentivising the transitioning to a fossil fuel free economy. Increasing the drugs supply to a drug addict increases their addition, not so much compared to the status quo, but compared to a successful programme to become clean. – gerrit Jan 03 '22 at 17:09
  • @dosvarog It is good to remind of Ukraine's constitutional block on foreign alliances, but that 1996 constitution was surely influenced by Budapest Memorandu in 1994, one of whose clauses says: Respect Belarusian, Kazakh and Ukrainian independence and sovereignty in the existing borders. Not that I think NATO admitting Ukraine is a good idea, but it does qualify your document somewhat. A status like Finland's liberal democracy and economy, but strict military neutrality during the Cold War could work. – Italian Philosophers 4 Monica Jan 04 '22 at 17:38
  • @ItalianPhilosophers4Monica, however that may be, shouldn't it be clear that it is for the people of the Ukraine to decide? Neutralizing a country by involuntary treaty and not by choice requires a political framework with workable security guarantees. – o.m. Jan 04 '22 at 17:46
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    @o.m. for sure. But admittance of Ukraine is not for Ukraine to decide, it is for NATO members countries to decide. And I really fail to see any upside for existing NATO members, so perhaps another model could be used, one that did not screw over Ukrainians but also did not present a security risk to Russia? Switzerland-like? Anyway, my main point is that citing the 1996 constitution's blocks on alliances is valid, but ignores that its context has radically changed. Finland remark is a minor point. – Italian Philosophers 4 Monica Jan 04 '22 at 17:53
  • NB it is "materiel", not "material" (in your last paragraph). – TylerH Jan 04 '22 at 19:14
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    "An American think tank believes that Russia could overrun the Baltics in 60 hours". I know, I have the advantage of hindsight, but that was the time it was supposed to take to overrun Ukraine. Since then we know that 3/4s of Russian arms don't work, and half of the rest has been destroyed. – gnasher729 Aug 23 '22 at 17:15
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    @gnasher729, possibly, but also consider how deep Russia did penetrate into Ukraine in the first days of the invasin. Lay that over a map of the Baltics. – o.m. Aug 23 '22 at 17:24
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    "An American think tank believes that Russia could overrun the Baltics in 60 hours." From a current perspective unlikely. The Russian military performance in Ukraine is relatively low. "if the US bans Russia from SWIFT, will that stop the Russian sale of gas to Europe?" With hindsight this can also be answered with a no. "It doesn't." NS2 didn't get activated so far. So far it did neither increase nor decrease anything. – NoDataDumpNoContribution Aug 23 '22 at 18:54
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The hypothesis cited is extremely speculative, to put it mildly. The world survived 44 years of high level competition between the USSR and NATO, when there was a fundamental drive by both systems to extinguish the other.

Avoiding total war was based on:

  • strong mutual conventional deterrence, meaning that there was ample room to escalate and de-escalate using conventional forces.
  • Mutually Assured Destruction at the nuclear level, should either bloc put the other truly at risk.
  • well-honed communication channels that were set up to avoid misunderstandings.
  • A clear understanding by both blocs that they had to keep their armed forces out of direct combat with each other, opting instead to work through proxies.

Most of this machinery is essentially still in place, yet what has dropped out is a very strong commitment by the US to end Communism, and a strong commitment by Russia/USSR to end capitalism. Compared to those times, what we are seeing today in the Ukraine arena is of very limited real danger to either bloc.

Russia does not have the forces to beat the West, but it also has no real reason to pursue the type of confrontation that would escalate to nuclear.

The US/Nato would never be able to "sell" to their electorate the idea of "putting Russia out of action". To be honest, it does not, nor should it, have the intent to fight Russia militarily to protect Ukraine. That sounds horrible, so let me repeat it: the West has no vital interest justifying putting its own troops in harm's way in Ukraine and risking an escalation chain. If Ukraine gets attacked, Russia will suffer consequences, but not of the type you imagine.

We are supposedly at greater risk now than we were say in 1985 and we would be safer if we were unarmed?

Color me skeptical. Both groups will continue to vie for regional influence, but at the end of the day nothing very significant will come out of it, except possibly some more misery for Ukraine. And a lot of economic pain to Russia if that happens.

Russia, in 2022, is not a long term existential threat to the West. China might end up taking on that role (hopefully we will avoid a second Cold War), but Russia is not. Russia teaming up with China? Quite possible, but also exactly the kind of development that would strongly rebut your advice.

Italian Philosophers 4 Monica
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    NATO used to be unable to resist Soviet conventional forces, so they promised to escalate to nuclear war. That deterrence worked for a few decades ... – o.m. Jan 02 '22 at 08:00
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    @o.m. in theory. In practice, would Soviet forces have punched through using conventional only and sustained the logistics? That is very much open for debate and in fact Soviet battle plans emphasized nuclear-supported tactical penetration. Threatening to escalate to nuclear war, by either side, was one way to keep ambiguity and avoid being gamed short of declared thresholds. – Italian Philosophers 4 Monica Jan 02 '22 at 08:04
  • @ItalianPhilosophers4Monica Now the roles seemed to have reversed, or at least the relative strengths, so to understand how committed Russia may be in using their nukes, how committed was NATO in 1980? – M. Y. Zuo Jan 02 '22 at 17:53
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    @M.Y.Zuo Nukes were always a last-resort for both sides but both systems were ideologically incompatible, with both claiming they wanted to shut the other down. Marxism raison d'etre is after all ending Capitalism (according to people who know its theory, I just follow Gulag victim counts and military doctrines). And US Capitalism had a rather rabid attitude towards Communism itself. Both sides still have their nukes left, but nowhere near the desire to wipe the other out and impose its will. So, no, 2022 is not 1985. – Italian Philosophers 4 Monica Jan 02 '22 at 18:34
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    This answer assumes that Western governments act in the interest of their people. The West has not had a vital interest in any of the conflicts it's engaged in post WW2. The reason for putting Western troops in harm's way in Ukraine would be the same as it's always been since Smedley Butler wrote War is a Racket: enrichment of politically connected industries at taxpayer expense. – Tech Inquisitor Jan 03 '22 at 16:38
  • @TechInquisitor We'll agree to disagree. In 1950, when South Korea was invaded, the US initially got its tail whupped. Why? Because it had largely demobilized since 1945. The USSR on the other hand started its great drive to export Communism (well see also Berlin Blockade 1948). A system which deprived hundreds of millions of any right to vote for decades, added pervasive secret polices aimed at internal repression and killed tens of millions in prison camps. Funnily enough a system which outlawed workers' unions in many cases. No vital interest, you say? Ha ha. – Italian Philosophers 4 Monica Jan 03 '22 at 17:18
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    Abuses by the West in places like Central America, failure to recognize reasonable aspirations for liberty in South Vietnam and the support of numerous pro-Western dictatorships (South Korea, Taiwan) do tarnish this struggle. But they do not obviate the need for standing firm against such a tyrannical system. What about racial injustices? True enough, again a stain on Western values, but one needs only look at the fate of the Cossacks in 1944 to see that the vaunted Communist ideal of universal human brotherhood was a joke. Better said here – Italian Philosophers 4 Monica Jan 03 '22 at 17:23
  • The above 2 posts are in no way meant to endorse the lucrative rackets of either the military industry complex or the modern peddlers of Communist hysteria like MT Greene or Tucker Carlson. They know good gig$$$ when they see them. – Italian Philosophers 4 Monica Jan 03 '22 at 17:33
  • @ItalianPhilosophers4Monica "Nukes were always a last-resort for both sides" is not really the case as far as I understand - while strategic bombing of heartlands was considered a last-resort MAD or a threat for a veto/ceasefire, applying tactical nukes within Europe was part of the official (then secret, but now available) 1960s military plans for USSR invading West Germany, so if a full-scale Warsaw Pact vs NATO land war would have erupted at the peak of the Cold War, we would expect at least some nukes to be used as part of the war before an escalation to last resort strategic weapons. – Peteris Jan 04 '22 at 00:37
  • @Peteris the US had Green Light Teams for the same purpose. – JJJ Jan 04 '22 at 01:26
  • @Peteris I am only aware of plans that were planned reactions to a possible NATO invasion to the East Germany. The 1964 operation plan for the Czechoslovak People's Army, for example. Which specific plans for an invasion to the west are you referring to? Something internal to the USSR? I can confirm the assumed massive use of tactical nuclear strikes, though. The plans assume that NATO will start with those and intelligence has to prepare the army to disperse from peace-time bases before that happens. – Vladimir F Героям слава Jan 04 '22 at 11:30
  • Russia absolutely is an 'existential threat' to the West, in the sense that it could cause it to cease to exist in its present state. I think what you meant was 'serious threat' – Valorum Jan 05 '22 at 12:29
  • "...more misery for Ukraine. And a lot of economic pain to Russia if that happens." Accurately predicted. – NoDataDumpNoContribution Aug 23 '22 at 18:51
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This question seems to simply presuppose that NATO is an aggressive entity bent on wiping out Russia, as "The West is wealthy" is treated as identical to "The West can support a large military", which is identical to "The West can conquer Russia", which is identical to "The West will conquer Russia". There's no question that the US could wipe out Mexico's military rather easily, but I don't see Mexicans clamoring for nukes. It would be absurd for Russia to launch a nuclear attack against the West simply because the West has high productivity and could launch an attack on Russia. Russia loses nothing by waiting for an actual attack before launching, and gains in the case where the West was not planning on attacking in the first place.

Since the dissolution of the USSR, Russia has repeatedly engaged in aggression against former states of the USSR, and a decrease in conventional power on the part of the West simply encourages such behavior. Russia is an oligarchy largely controlled by one man, while the West is a collection of states with a large degree of democratic control. This makes Russia much more likely to be the aggressor, and giving them more power decreases stability.

Acccumulation
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  • I see no such presupposition in the question. – Vladimir F Героям слава Jan 03 '22 at 12:41
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    Russia has been invaded from Western Europe several times in history (I'm not sure if Russia has ever invaded Western Europe except for WW II) but never while Moscow was so close to the border. That's probably why they're keen on keeping Belarus and Ukraine as their satellites, having already lost most/all of the rest as a buffer zone. – gerrit Jan 03 '22 at 17:18
  • @VladimirF I presented my logic. How do you think it is flawed? How would the West becoming more wealthy pose a threat to Russia, unless the West has a desire to conquer Russia? – Acccumulation Jan 03 '22 at 18:07
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    @gerrit Pretty much every country has been invaded, and most, like Russia, have invaded other countries. This "we're justified in invading other countries to create a buffer zone against other countries invading us" argument is silly. Moscow is ~200 miles from their closest border, more than the width of most countries. – Acccumulation Jan 03 '22 at 18:14
  • @Acccumulation No need to convince me. Tell Putin :) – gerrit Jan 04 '22 at 08:42
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    @Acccumulation says a citizen of pretty much the least-invaded country of the world ;-) I don't believe the Russians are only doing this for defensive reasons, but, if they were, their security concerns would not be all that dissimilar to the US's reaction to Cuba during the Cold War. BTW, assuming your opponent means you no harm isn't the highpoint of clear contingency planning. – Italian Philosophers 4 Monica Jan 04 '22 at 15:51
  • @ItalianPhilosophers4Monica Interesting how you just slide in the assumption that NATO is Russia's "opponent" in there. Not assuming that another country is out to get you is not the same thing as assuming that it means you no harm. That's a wild false dichotomy. Assuming no other countries are out to get you is poor contingency planning, but so is attacking all your neighbors to create a "buffer" of puppet states surrounding you. – Acccumulation Jan 04 '22 at 18:45
  • FYI, a detailed analysis of Mexico's military and some comparison of it to the U.S. military can be found at https://washparkprophet.blogspot.com/2021/07/mexicos-military-considered.html – ohwilleke Jan 04 '22 at 22:14
  • @gerrit just as a side note: Russia occupied Paris after Napoleon lost around 1814. – lalala Jan 05 '22 at 09:39
  • @Acccumulation "How would the West becoming more wealthy pose a threat to Russia" It's the old 600lb gorilla problem: interests will conflict (eg the EU wants to spend as little as possible on Russian gas, Russia wants the EU to buy a lot at high prices), and a strong rich united EU is a problem for Russia simply because they're more likely to win.

    Also, the EU would like to enforce human rights obligations on other countries, and Putin &co don't want anyone to be able to enforce anything against them. It's a more distant ambition/concern, but it could be a problem for Putin's heir.

     – user1567459 Jan 05 '22 at 12:34
  • @user1567459 I meant "threat" as in "invasion". "interests will conflict (eg the EU wants to spend as little as possible on Russian gas, Russia wants the EU to buy a lot at high prices), and a strong rich united EU is a problem for Russia simply because they're more likely to win. " No, one's customers becoming richer is a good thing. It means they can pay more. – Acccumulation Jan 05 '22 at 23:59
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    "Russia is an oligarchy largely controlled by one man, while the West is a collection of states with a large degree of democratic control. This makes Russia much more likely to be the aggressor, and giving them more power decreases stability." Citation needed. While dictatorships and autocracies may be horrible to those living under them, democracies are far more dangerous to outsiders. While tyrants spend their time tyrannizing its own people, democracies resort to external wars to distract people from internal affairs. Most attacks on external soil are carried by democracies. – Rekesoft Jan 07 '22 at 09:15
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    @Rekesoft It's common sense that the fewer people that are needed to agree before going to war, it easier it is to go to war. And in a dictatorship, if the leader says they should go to war, people aren't allowed to disagree, or to dispute the alleged basis for the war, and it's easier to engage in conscription. And I don't agree that democracies have historically been more aggressive than dictatorships. – Acccumulation Jan 08 '22 at 01:43
  • @Accumulation When George W Bush decided to start a war against Irak after 9/11, the US went to war. Maybe some citizens were against it, just some of them were in favour, but there was war nevertheless, and the number of people consulted was no bigger than in a dictatorship - usually dictators count on the support of the army, so they have to consult the top brass before an action like that. And here's a list of wars from 1950 to 1989 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_wars:_1945%E2%80%931989); nearly all conflicts with invasion of territory were carried by democracies. – Rekesoft Jan 09 '22 at 15:56
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    @Rekesoft Iraq was in violation of a cease fire, thus the invasion was arguably a continuation of the war that Iraq (a dictatorship) started. Even if you consider it a different war, that's one each in the dictatorship and democracy column. Bush had to consult the House and Senate, a total of 535, and he then had to seek reelection from millions of people. The idea that dictators have as much check on their power is absurd. And not only is your link a Gish gallop, most seem to be civil wars. – Acccumulation Jan 09 '22 at 20:21
  • @Accumulation The idea that dictators runs a country by their own is naive: they rely on the support of the army, powerful allied donors, large proportions of the population, religious or civilian leaders, industrial and finances oligarchs and so on. Saddam Hussein made consultations with far more people before invading Kuwait than Bush needed to declare war on Iraq. And while the president of a democracy risks reelection by launching a war, a dictator usually risks its own life, so they're more cautious. Saddam or Videla were dictators who started wars and ended dead or imprisoned. – Rekesoft Jan 09 '22 at 21:00
  • @Rekesoft Me: "Russia is an oligarchy largely controlled by one man". You: "The idea that dictators runs a country by their own is naive". Like those straw men, don't you? "Saddam Hussein made consultations with far more people before invading Kuwait than Bush needed to declare war on Iraq." Argument by assertion. "a dictator usually risks its own life" First you say wars distract the people from opposing a dictator, now you say doing so risks death. Saddam was killed by the US, so the risk would have been the same if he had been democratically elected. – Acccumulation Jan 10 '22 at 01:16
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    @Rekesoft: it was on TV to see https://nypost.com/2022/02/22/putin-lashes-out-at-russia-intelligence-chief-in-viral-video/ – the gods from engineering Aug 23 '22 at 17:50
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No, because game theory assumes you have to play the game

As von Clausewitz famously said, war is a continuation of politics by other means. War is not an end in itself, and war is not the only way to win. The West did not win the previous Cold War by being militarily stronger, they won it by being economically stronger. For another way to win economically, China are currently taking over the world quietly by making large infrastructure loans to developing nations, and then taking assets from that country instead when they can't repay their loans.

War also assumes you have something to gain once it's over. Typically this is economic resources, as exemplified by Germany and Japan in WW2. If it's purely a willy-waving exercise where you start posturing and find you can't back down (as in WW1) then you generally need some way to present the enemy as an existential threat to your people. That's fairly achievable for immediate neighbours, but rather harder for an entire continent. Alternatively (as with Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran) you need to be a sufficiently brutal dictator that your people will do what you say because they're more scared of you than the enemy - this is an option, but it's harder to do in more advanced countries.

And more than that, this game theory assumes "acceptable losses" are genuinely acceptable. Fewer UK military personnel were killed in Afghanistan and Iraq over both campaigns than die on UK roads in a single year - but these weren't deemed acceptable losses. Is it genuinely acceptable to have every major city nuked, lose 80% of your population, and have the survivors reduced to a life of hand-to-mouth subsistence for at least a generation with all industrialisation basically destroyed?

To quote a well-known film, "The only winning move is not to play."

Graham
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    I saw that particular film no less than twelve times in junior high school, because it was the tool teachers used to mind students when they had other obligations and the school only had two or three movies available in its stockpile. :) – ohwilleke Jan 04 '22 at 22:30
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Frame Challenge:

You forgot about the likelihood of China and Russia aligning in any conventional armed conflict. They have a rough past sure, but the enemy of my enemy is my friend. If NATO is the enemy, they're best buds. This tips the scales far closer to even. Even if not a direct alliance, China would most likely supply the difference in armaments on loan. It's in their interest to protect the shared border with Russia from any Western influence.

To be clear here, my point is that M.A.D. is practically guaranteed in modern conventional war as well (note Russia FOAB mentioned in the article, amongst the literal 100,000's of "small" bombs in each nations stockpiles), if the U.S. and any other large, modern nation "went at it" without holding back. It's unlikely a full-scale conventional war between any of the powers mentioned will occur again - instead the countries will opt for proxy wars fighting for influence, as they've done for decades. In terms of "taking over" another nation, that's much more likely to be attempted (and accomplished) through economic, and even cultural "warfare".

The frame challenge is that neither Russia nor the U.S. has any real, worthwhile interest in a full scale conventional war with the other. A key factor would be, if nukes were entirely eliminated, that other parties besides Russia would have an interest in harming the U.S. effort, namely China given the modern political landscape.

https://www.voanews.com/a/china-deepens-informal-alliance-with-russia/6338773.html

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China%E2%80%93Russia_relations

https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2021/10/15/china-russia-launch-joint-naval-drills-in-russian-far-east/#:~:text=The%20exercises%20Joint%20Sea%202021,and%20firing%20on%20seaborn%20targets.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-russia-america-military-exercises-weapons-war-xi-putin-biden-11641146041

https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a37272876/russia-china-joint-military-exercises/

TCooper
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    Speculative in the extreme. Russia and China are anything but best buddies. While their interests may coincide at times, and one may see a move by the other as an opportunity for itself, that doesn't mean active cooperation. So if China attacks Taiwan, drawing substantial US forces there, Russia may see an opportunity and attack Ukraine and the Baltics now that the US is weak in Europe. – jwenting Jan 04 '22 at 08:23
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    Thought: China probably picked up something from the USA in WW2 and will likely have a great time staying out of a potential conflcit between the NATO and Russia and benefit greatly from having an unharmed production capacity and a relatively unharmed (or even boosted because everyone will be buying from them) economy. – Benjamin Gruenbaum Jan 04 '22 at 14:03
  • @jwenting Do the 5 sources I've included not remove much of the speculation? – TCooper Jan 04 '22 at 15:30
  • @BenjaminGruenbaum Please see the sentence "Even if not a direct alliance, China would happily supply the difference in armaments on loan." – TCooper Jan 04 '22 at 15:31
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    "Even if not a direct alliance, China would most likely supply the difference in armaments on loan." So far, China didn't supply notable armaments to Russia while Russia is still waging war in Ukraine, neither on loan nor for payment. – NoDataDumpNoContribution Aug 23 '22 at 18:56
  • @Trilarion yes, but Russia is only in need of troops at this point. Given its a special military operation, not a war(in their official dialogue on the home front, obviously not), they're yet to tap close to their full conventional capability in terms of tanks, jets, bombers, etc. China is selling what Russia is buying though - https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/chinese-firms-are-selling-russia-goods-its-military-needs-to-keep-fighting-in-ukraine-11657877403 – TCooper Aug 24 '22 at 19:20
  • @TCooper You're right. It can still happen in the future. Just wanted to say that it hasn't happened yet. – NoDataDumpNoContribution Aug 24 '22 at 21:14
  • @Trilarion Fair enough, but important to note it's also not a war with the NATO either. If anything I'd say seeing the chip shortage in the US and a double in exports of chips to Russia is pretty convincing evidence the assumption made in my answer would be correct if the hypothetical situation ever arose (lets keep our fingers crossed it doesn't, MAD and all) – TCooper Aug 25 '22 at 22:21
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I really hope that in the case of the WWIII, both sides would agree to fight with ordinary weapons only regardless the end because deploying nuclear weapons still does not ensure any easy victory for Russia. NATO has nuclear weapons as well, the strike back will follow and will also be devastating. If in general it could be a winner in a nuclear war, may still not be Russia.

History knows cases like that. For instance, during WWII, A.Hitler had chemical weapons, and he also lost the war but (apart few limited cases) these weapons were not deployed.

Stančikas
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  • Here's my prediction: Putin has already destroyed Russia's wealth. He has demonstrated that you can't have strong military in a kleptocracy, and invading Ukraine was a move of utter stupidity. In Russia, its everyone for himself. And all the people at the top want to continue enjoying their life. So maybe Putin tries to call someone to launch nuclear weapons. If he tries, one if his thousand strong body guards, who prefers a nice life, will take him out before he can. – gnasher729 Aug 23 '22 at 17:21
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    The story (true or not) is that Hitler, as a WWI soldier, got badly injured by chemical weapons, and as a result disallowed all the German troops to use them first under any circumstances. – gnasher729 Aug 23 '22 at 17:53
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At present, Russia, like many other Nuclear Powers, has a second strike only policy. This means that in the event of war with another nuclear power, Russia would only launch it's Nukes if it detected a launch from the belligerent side. They would never be the first to use nukes. The United States is one of the few nations that did not adopt a second strike only policy, opting for one that basically said we will keep the war restricted to conventional arms until we detect Nukes inbound OR we think a tactile nuclear strike is in our interest (Read: We're about to lose and the only way to win the battle is if all the opposing conventional forces were suddenly vaporized). Considering which of the two is the only nation to ever use nuclear arms in actual combat... and you could see why the Russians were so nervous about the West... which was politically opposed to Soviet style government.

It also explains why the Soviets added a "dead man switch" to their nuclear command and control. They will launch if a signal is not received from Moscow within a certain amount of time (the engineering of this system is such that the only way for Moscow to fail to send the signal is if Moscow suddenly was no longer on the face of the earth. Russia has historically been very vulnerable to decapitation strikes. Their capital is much more important than any other city. It's also one of the reasons Russia is pretty difficult to invade.).

That all said, many Nuclear War scenarios, especially in the 80s when the cold war started to go towards a hot one, was that NATO-Warsaw Pact war would start off with a flashpoint crisis of some sort (Trouble in East Berlin or a Crisis in the Middle East) which raise tensions with both powers until the opening salvos of a conventional war begin, at which point, it's a conventional war with infintry, tanks, air battles, and naval battles. The thought is that NATO would have the naval advantage, Warsaw would have the land advantage, and it would be a dead even split on air superiority.

At some point, one of the land battles is going bad for their side... they can barely hold the line and enemy reserves are enroute to the front lines and once there, they will break through. For whatever reason, losing this position in the opening actions of war is unacceptable so the side that is on the ropes will launch a tactical nuke at the re-enforcements because its all they have left. The side that is nuked sees this on early warning detections and, with the fog of war, have no way of knowing if it was the only nuke.

But the thing about Nuclear arms is that the best national defense against a nuclear bomb... is to have a nuclear bomb of your own. That, and the ability to convince the enemy that if backed into a corner... we will use it.

It's estimated that in a total nuclear war between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. that all but 3% of either side's Nuclear Arsenal will be delivered to the intended target when launched. And that both sides had 30 minutes of travel from ground launch points until they reached their target. Now, to the side that sees that lone nuke fired at their re-enforcements... they have no way of knowing if that missile is a shot that will win the battle, or the first shot in a war ending salvo. They have no way to talk to the other side at this point. They have less than 30 minutes at best to retaliate before they lose that capability and the lives of everyone on the home front. It doesn't matter if it's one launch or one thousand launches... if they want even a hope of a chance to win this war, be it for mom and apple pie, or perogies and suka, there's now only one thing to do. Launch everything, and hope that the 3% of arsenal that survives is your own. Of course... the only way to learn their true intentions, is to see if they launch all of theirs before you've launched all of yours... either way... who lost the war is now decided... all that can be said is that we will know who won sooner... because at either rate, nobody does.

And what is troubling, is that in so many scenarios, the implication if not outright statement was that it was the U.S. losing ground that pressed the button first... and those were the predictions from the West... because as was said in the film "War Games," in global-thermonuclear war, the only winning move is to not to play the game. It's how we won the Cold War.

Much like in my family when my sister suggest we play Monopoly (sorry, after writing all that sobering stuff, I had to get a laugh in somehow.).

hszmv
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    This answer is factually incorrect. Russia's published nuclear doctrine is not no-first-use. It envisions the use of nuclear weapons in response to purely conventional attack "when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy." Contrast to China, whose doctrine is "China will never at any time and under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons." – cpast Aug 24 '22 at 00:24