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The Strait of Gibraltar, at its narrowest point, is about 14 km wide. Why didn't Germany blockade it during WW2?

It seems to me that only a handful of submarines and destroyers could do the job. Wasn't the German Navy (Kriegsmarine) capable of blockading it? Did submarine wolf packs at least hunt at that chokepoint?

The blockade would apply to US/UK/USSR ships, but allow Spanish and other neutral countries of course. Presumably this would not be a political problem for Spain.

Note: I'm not talking about the Gibraltar Fortress under British control. That's a different matter.

Rodrigo de Azevedo
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DrZ214
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    The UK would have loved for Germany to try to plant a bunch of their ships in one known place for an extended period of time. They spent most of that war scouring the oceans for them. – T.E.D. Jun 14 '16 at 14:47
  • @T.E.D. Well okay but if the Strait is guarded such that they can't get them without braving an enfilading strafe of torpedoes, then it wouldn't do much good even if they knew where they are. Please join the discussion with me and DevSolar, because I'm trying to understand why such a narrow waterway cannot be blockaded, particularly with submarines. – DrZ214 Jun 14 '16 at 17:06
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    But the problem is that the straights were so narrow. You're looking at it backwards. It wasn't that "they're so narrow they should have been able to blockade them", it was, "they're so narrow they are easily defended by surface vessels with sonar". There was (almost) no place to actually hide from those vessels and airplanes, and the straights are (relatively) shallow, so no u-boats traversed the straights during daylight hours unless they had no other choice. – CGCampbell Jun 14 '16 at 18:26
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    An aerial picture of a submarine at periscope depth (http://www.strangemilitary.com/content/item/113453.html). Add to that that, during the night, radar and Leigh lights made it not too difficult to spot and attack submarines; in fact the germans had to develop the snorkels to be able to replenish oxygen without surfacing... – SJuan76 Jun 14 '16 at 18:29
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    This one has an even better image but is from a WWI submarine and in shallow waters. Do you want to be near an enemy plane on this? – SJuan76 Jun 14 '16 at 18:44
  • Why not block the suez or panama canal they are much smaller ?? lol – sdrawkcabdear Jun 14 '16 at 20:31
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    With the fortress Gibraltar intact to launch airstrikes against the subs? Are you mad? Seriously you must dispose of the fortress first, to which the only hope is the Italian battleships. If they can get within gun range of it (a whole 'nother can of worms) they can level it but otherwise ... – Joshua Jun 15 '16 at 03:35
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    "Das Boot", admittedly fiction, graphically explores the difficulty of simply sailing a submarine through the Strait, let alone exercising any force there. – user_1818839 Jun 15 '16 at 16:45
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    A very, very short answer would be: because the British already blockaded it. – vsz Jun 16 '16 at 14:04
  • As I understand, Admiral Rader proposed an airbase of Stukas protected by Me 109s on the south side of the strait on the Spanish Ceuta. This was before the Stukas were wasted over Britain. –  Jul 23 '16 at 21:50
  • @BrianDrummond: Actually, "Das Boot" is not that fictional. While certainly "tweaked" for cineastic effect, the movie is based on a novel by Lothar-Günther Buchheim, who did serve as war correspondent on submarines, including the 7th patrol of U96. They did resupply at Vigo, they did try to break through at Gibraltar, they were spotted and bombed by airplane, they did limp back heavily damaged. – DevSolar May 02 '17 at 07:56

7 Answers7

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...but if the Strait is guarded such that they can't get them without braving an enfilading strafe of torpedoes, then it wouldn't do much good even if they knew where they are.

From this comment by the OP, and others like it, it seems they don't appreciate the tactical limitations and vulnerabilities of a WWII submarine. I'll address that. While WWII submarines can be devastating to unescorted (or, earlier in the war, even escorted) merchant ships, they are extremely vulnerable to even small warships.

First thing to realize is WWII submarines aren't really submarines like modern submarines are. They are first and foremost surface ships. They spend most of their time on the surface where they can see (relying on lookouts with binoculars), move quickly, and use relatively cheap and plentiful deck gun ammunition to sink vulnerable merchant ships. It wasn't until the revolutionary Type XXI, completed at the war's very end, that the submarine would be able to spend the majority of its time under water.

Underwater a WWII submarine is very slow, has very limited battery power (a few hours at any kind of speed), limited breathing time, and must fire relatively short ranged (1000-5000 meters effective range), slow (20-40 knots), unguided, expensive torpedoes which are in limited supply and slow to reload. A Type VII submarine had only 14 torpedoes and just 6 tubes (4 bow, 2 stern). Once they were fired it could take an hour to reload. Hitting a slow, unaware, leisurely zig-zagging merchant ship was tricky enough and it usually took all 4 bow torpedoes to guarantee a hit. Hitting a fast, wildly maneuvering warship aware of your presence is almost impossible.

A German Type VII submarine, their most plentiful, could do 18 knots on the surface, but just 8 underwater. Surfaced, they had a range of 8500 miles, underwater just 80 miles... at a leisurely 4 knots. While submerged a target had to almost run them over to allow a torpedo attack, they could not chase them down.

While they carried an 88mm deck gun with 220 rounds of ammunition, this is a peashooter compared to what even the smallest destroyer carries. With a single gun, an unstable platform from which to shoot it (ie. the submarine rolls a lot), inferior range-finding gear, slow speed, and no armor... to be caught on the surface by even a well-armed merchantman was suicide. This was exploited by Q-Ships, armed merchantmen made to look like juicy deck gun targets.

If they stay deep they're safer, but also blind relying only on hydrophones (underwater microphones) to detect ships. If they want to use their periscope they must come up to periscope depth, shallow enough so their periscope can reach the surface. It's a tricky process to hold a WWII submarine at periscope depth. Come up a few feet and your scope is sticking up high out of the water and easy to be spotted. Come down a few feet and you can't see anything. The view isn't very good, being at the surface of the ocean and through a series of lenses.

Which brings us to the most underappreciated part of anti-submarine warfare (ASW): airplanes. We like to think of objects underwater as being effectively invisible, but from a high vantage point, like an airplane, a 200 foot long submarine can be seen quite easily at periscope depth. If an airplane spots a submarine on the surface it can be attacked with guns and bombs. At periscope depth it can be depth charged. To avoid attack, the submarine must dive deep to get away. Even if the airplane doesn't get the submarine, the submarine is now slow, blind, and losing battery power. With it's long loiter time, an ASW aircraft could hold a submarine down until a warship arrives to hunt it down with sonar.


With all that in mind, what happens when the German navy attempts to blockade the Strait of Gibraltar with submarines augmented with e-boats, destroyers and other light surface ships. To give it the best chance of succeeding, let's set it in the late summer of 1940 at the height of the Battle of Britain. The RAF is overstretched, the US hasn't entered the war, and ASW aircraft don't have radar capable of detecting submarine periscopes.

The German navy at this point is in bad shape. Never anything like a match for the Royal Navy, the war had started a few years too soon and naval production schedules were thrown into chaos. They had just taken a mauling in the otherwise wildly successful invasion of Norway losing many small ships.

At this point Germany only had 9 destroyers. They started the war with only 21, had since lost 12, and had only since commissioned one. They wouldn't last long with the major Royal Navy base of Gibraltar right there. It's unlikely Germany would risk its remaining overworked 9 destroyers on such a risky mission as blockading the Strait.

The Germans had E-boats, small, fast, expendable torpedo boats, and in some quantity. And, like a submarine, they were also extremely vulnerable to any real warship. Their short range precludes them from being used in this operation. Spain is staunchly neutral, and the south of France and Morocco are Vichy French territory who can still deny the Germans from using their ports.

While smaller ships have a hope of dodging the Royal Navy, larger surface vessels would be target practice. No German capital ship would risk staying in one area long enough for the RN to find them.

So no support from the German surface navy.

What about submarines? At this point in the war, the Germans had only commissioned 25 Type VII submarines of which only 13 remained. Their larger, ocean-going Type IX was too precious to be used in such an operation. At this point they had commissioned 11 but only 4 were left. It wasn't until 1941 that production would ramp up into the hundreds we think about when we think about the U-Boat war, but by then they were losing their technological edge.

This pitifully small number of capable submarines meant not only would the blockade be difficult to maintain, but submarines would have to be taken from the then very successful Battle of the Atlantic probably never to return.

Already, even in the summer of 1940, U-Boats were taking very heavy loses. And this was while mostly avoiding the Royal Navy. You're proposing they take them head on. Let's see what happens.


A submarine operating in the Strait of Gibraltar has all sorts of problems. It's a death trap. A submarine's single advantage and defense is stealth. This can be in not being detectable, but it's also not knowing where it's going to show up next. The enemy has to spread their ASW resources very thin looking for you. If German submarines try to blockade the Strait you know where you look and can concentrate your search in a small and restricted area. Only about 10 miles separates Africa from Europe. If detected there's nowhere to go. Being right next to a heavily fortified and extremely valuable British naval base means retaliation will be immediate and heavy.

A submarine that doesn't want to be detected in the Strait has a fighting chance... if they're moving into the Mediterranean west to east with the currents. The mixing salinity between the Atlantic and Mediterranean made underwater detection difficult, and the currents could be used to transit the Strait silently. It was still a very, very dangerous transit. Out of 62 U-Boats which made the trip from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean, 9 were sunk and 10 turned back. None returned.

But our submarines are on the attack, and a submarine running deep cannot see or attack. Our submarines have to spend their nights on the surface charging batteries and hunting, and their days either submerged avoiding aircraft and saving battery power, or hunting at periscope depth, but also vulnerable to ASW aircraft. Stuck in a narrow box of ocean, they're easy pickings for ASW aircraft and ships who can patrol over the area again and again and again until they've hunted them all down.

In addition to ASW hunters, any merchant ships transiting the Strait can be formed into convoys and protected by heavy ASW escort. Since the submarines are bunched up in the Strait, the same ASW fleet can protect all convoys moving through the gap. Submarines would not be allowed unescorted targets.

Attacking an escorted convoy would be suicide. Even with surprise, even with a wolf pack, avenging ASW aircraft and ships are never far away at Gibraltar. Every attack would pinpoint the submarines' position, and at 8 knots submerged they can't get far before an ASW vessel or aircraft shows up to search.

As for larger Royal Navy ships which might be worth the risk, they will either avoid the Strait until it is cleared, or be heavily escorted and moving at high speed. Capital ships have little place in an ASW fight except to be targets.


To sum up why they didn't try this...

  • Submarines are extremely vulnerable to even the smallest warship.
  • Submarines have to be surfaced most of the time.
  • Submarines must be surfaced or near the surface to attack, vulnerable to ASW aircraft.
  • The Germans would only be able to muster a dozen submarines.
  • No support from the surface navy.
  • ASW search would be relatively easy in the restricted area.
  • Convoys could be heavily protected in the restricted area.
  • ASW ships and aircraft were close by at Gibraltar.
  • The British would react very violently.

An attempt by the Germans to blockade the Strait would be a dream come true for the British. It would draw the entire German submarine fleet away from their very hard pressed Atlantic merchant convoys, and into a fixed area where they can be hunted and destroyed by a relatively small number of cheap, short-ranged ASW warships and aircraft.


For an appreciation of the troubles of a WWII submarine, I recommend the famous fictional but quite accurate German submarine movie Das Boot. They even have to transit the Strait.

I would also highly recommend the historical book One Of Our Submarines, the account of British WWII submarine captain Edward Young. This is an accurate, detailed, and very well written biographical account of submarine life and tactics. He also has to deal with straits, and without the luxury of deep water.

Avoid the dreadful and wildly inaccurate movie U-571.

Schwern
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    Thank you, you pretty much attacked the answer from every possible angle. Sadly I've already seen U-571 but I assure you I do not trust Hollywood and my question did not spawn from it. My question spawned from curiosity as to why such a narrow waterway was not blockaded. (This is about to lead me to ask why the British did not blockade it.) I watched a fraction of Das Boot but could not finish it due to culture clash, maybe I'll try again. I'll add the book to my ever-growing wishlist stack and maybe get to it a few years from now. – DrZ214 Jun 14 '16 at 20:27
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    @DrZ214 Gibraltar was effectively blockaded by the British, but except for submarines it didn't affect the Axis much. For supplies to North Africa the Axis could use much shorter route from Italy and Greece. The Italian navy was already in the Mediterranean and wasn't designed to leave it. The German surface navy was either bottled up in port or out commerce raiding. – Schwern Jun 14 '16 at 20:45
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    This was an absolutely amazing answer, once of the best I've seen on stack* in a long time. – Dave Jun 14 '16 at 23:22
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    A very good answer, dispelling the misconception many people have about WW2 submarines being similar to those seen in "the Hunt for Red October". Comparing a WW2 submarine to a late cold war submarine is like comparing a rickety wooden WW1 fighter aircraft with a modern jet fighter. Basically, WW1 and WW2 submarines were just torpedo boats with the additional capability to briefly submerge. It would have been nice if you had pointed out that WW2 torpedoes were unguided, therefore only effective in a surprise attack. A topic I missed was what if the Germans also used aircraft to counter ASW. – vsz Jun 15 '16 at 06:11
  • The Germans could have used aircraft located in bases in North Africa to counter the British ASW aircrafts. However, I would guess that before or in the early part of the Battle of Britain when the Germans were winning, they wouldn't have wanted to remove aircraft from the BoB, and after the BoB the German air-force was stretched thin so they couldn't have easily afforded to move too much fighter aircraft to Africa. – vsz Jun 15 '16 at 06:13
  • @vsz Not only were they unguided, but they also had the nasty habit of not exploding when they were supposed to. So you shot a full 4-torpedo salvo, one or tho torpedoes might have hit, and quite possible, neither would explode. Really, submarines mostly used their deck guns against merchant ships :D – Luaan Jun 15 '16 at 06:58
  • to make matters worse, the torpedoes were divided between different torpedo rooms (bow and stern) with no way to move them to the other room, the rear torpedoes being rarely used. Thus the actual useful torpedo load was even less (1 torpedo per tube plus one spare for a total of 12 torpedoes in the bow room). In later boats, the stern room was for that reason often used to pack extra supplies instead, allowing for longer patrols. – jwenting Jun 15 '16 at 11:01
  • Did you mean "4-5 knots"? – chrylis -cautiouslyoptimistic- Jun 15 '16 at 14:30
  • @chrylis I assume you mean instead of "40-50 knots". No, that is correct because it's about torpedo speeds. At least it's in the ballpark, the G7a went 30-40 knots, while the G7e could do 20-30. – Schwern Jun 15 '16 at 17:35
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    @vsz I considered going into the air war, but it would have dragged focus from an already far too long answer. One point though, the Germans did not have control of North Africa near Gibraltar. That was all Vichy French. While we think of Vichy France as a puppet state, they had their own military and government and were quite adamant in defending their sovereignty. I don't have evidence that the Germans ever based aircraft in VC North Africa to counter Gibraltar. For example, I don't recall German aircraft being involved in the opening invasion of Operation Torch. – Schwern Jun 15 '16 at 18:25
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    @Schwern Just IMO, this answer is not far too long at all. I'm an infophile and would read a book if it's in response to my honest specific question, especially when I carry on an argument/debate about it. I've always thought the semi-independent Vichy France was because Hitler saw the west folks as more Aryan, but I thought he finally did force all his will on it in late 43 or 44, which would be too late for my question since UK/US had North Africa by then. – DrZ214 Jun 16 '16 at 12:53
  • @Schwern I don't recall reading anything about using the deck guns apart from finishing off an already torpedoed boat (and a odd story about a ground installation). Also of note, the Mediterranean sea waters are much clearer than Atlantic and even submerged would be more easily detected by a plane than in the Atlantic for example. – BlakBat Jun 16 '16 at 21:59
  • From "Niestle" German U-Boats losses during WWII, I count 6 directly sunk in the Gibraltar Strait, 9 west of the strait but east of 10°W, and approx. 24 est of the Strait, west of 10°E and south of 40°N. – BlakBat Jun 16 '16 at 22:09
  • @BlakBat Torpedoes are expensive and a U-Boat only has 14. Once they're gone they have to leave their station to resupply either at a port or from a Milchkuh. If a target could be sunk by gunfire, it was. This would mostly be unescorted merchant ships, particularly small ships, judged safe to attack on the surface and not worth a torpedo. Due to the Atlantic convoy system, such targets for U-Boats might have been limited. This might have been more prevalent in the Pacific, there's plenty of deck gun action in One Of Our Submarines. – Schwern Jun 17 '16 at 04:34
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    One subtle point missed: With the success of B-DIenst in breaking British Admiralty codes until June 1943, U-Boats typically knew the convoy routes of North Atlantic merchant vessels in advance, and often also of their supporting vessels. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B-Dienst – Pieter Geerkens Jun 18 '16 at 12:11
  • @PieterGeerkens The Battle of the Atlantic was effectively won in May 1943, a month before that break was fixed. It illustrates ASW is less about avoiding U-Boats, and more about detecting and defeating them. Knowing the convoy locations isn't very useful for U-Boats blockading Gibraltar, they still have to attack protected convoys in a small area. Easy pickings for ASW. They could, instead, try to attack convoys bound for Gibraltar in the Atlantic. – Schwern Jun 18 '16 at 21:37
  • You mistook my point: "Why engage in a dangerous blockade of Gibraltar with such easy pickings available on the North Atlantic routes?" – Pieter Geerkens Jun 18 '16 at 23:43
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    @PieterGeerkens I see. Yes, that would be a "distant blockade" which is exactly what the U-Boats did. Probably with an answer. – Schwern Jun 19 '16 at 00:03
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    Can you clarify exactly why U-571 is 'dreadful'? Your link criticises the choice of Americans carrying out the capture (and rightly so), but it's mum on how accurate it is on the everyday facts of WWII submarines which is the bulk of your answer. And if it is in fact inaccurate on that regard, a link to a description of what ways it's inaccurate would be much appreciated. – E.P. Jun 19 '16 at 23:49
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    @E.P. I haven't seen it since it came out, so I'm going to (*slight retch*) rewatch it. The short version is this: its an action movie and about as relevant to WWII submarine warfare as Rambo II is to infantry combat. This article outlines the worst problems and the very long list of goofs on IMDB. One thing I was surprised to learn is the US Atlantic fleet did feature many WWI-era submarines, the newer boats were in the Pacific. – Schwern Jun 20 '16 at 05:34
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    @E.P. Well, you asked for it. I might turn it into its own Q/A later, or even a whole review. For now, enjoy my notes. – Schwern Jun 21 '16 at 01:26
  • @Schwern The first link was plenty. I'll look at your notes, ping me here if you do Q&A them. – E.P. Jun 21 '16 at 01:58
  • Excellent answer. Just to underscore how highly advantageous was to have aircraft to hunt for a submarine, consider that until Navy had Merchant aircraft carrier, they used as stop-gap measure CAM ship which has only catapult and aircraft could not land once launched (was ditched to the ocean) - and still it was worth as a defense from subs. – Peter M. - stands for Monica Dec 28 '18 at 20:58
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    Official Naval Staff History: "Frequently when there were no kills it was the very presence of aircraft, carrier-borne or shore-based, or both which prevented the development of the attack by a concentration of U-boats on the convoy and which allowed it to continue on its way unmolested." – Peter M. - stands for Monica Dec 28 '18 at 21:00
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Gibraltar during the war had a quite formidable British naval presence (Force H), an airfield, and significant coastal gun emplacements easily capable of covering the entire strait.

The primary batteries were a set of twin 9.2" naval guns guns at the southern end of the peninsula, which had sufficient range to interdict all surface naval traffic through the straits. Six more single-gun batteries of 9.2" naval guns were placed facing seaward to the east. Finally, a twin 9.2" howitzer battery faced the straits as well.

The secondary batteries were just as numerous, with eight 6" naval guns, although three of these faced northward, toward the border with Spain. A tertiary armament of four 4" guns in two batteries protected the eastward cliffs.

Avalanche Press, The Rock of Gibraltar: Fact or Fiction?

Trying to blockade the strait would not have gone unopposed, and would likely be impossible without attacking / suppressing / capturing the fortress itself.

For which Germany had plans (Operation Felix), which however were postponed "until after the defeat of Soviet Russia".

At all times during the war, the German navy -- being significantly outnumbered -- tried to avoid engagements with the Royal Navy, not go looking for them. German warships and submarines were tasked to attack convoys, disrupt overseas trade, or protect land-based operations (Norway). At no point was a head-to-head confrontation with the Royal Navy a winable prospect for Germany.

Operation Berlin, Operation Rheinübung, Operation Cerberus, operational history of the Tirpitz and the Admiral Graf Spee.

Attacking the Strait of Gibraltar, then staying there and waiting for British reinforcements, would have been several flavors of foolish.


From the comments, the OP asked if it wouldn't be possible for "one or two dozen submarines" to blockade the strait.

Submarines in WWII are hit-and-run weapons. With extremely limited range and speed while submerged, they are required to operate at the surface (or, in case of the later snorkel-equipped boats, near the surface). They close in surfaced, attack at night or from submerged ambush, and then avoid enemy escorts. Once detected, a submarine is firmly on the defensive.

"Blockading" submarines would have to operate close to the coast, the enemy naval base, and most importantly enemy airfields. They would lose the element of surprise, would be actively searched for (a submarine close to the surface is easily spotted from the air, a deep-diving submarine isn't blockading), and once spotted they would be hunted down.

Even against an outdated destroyer a submarine is at a stiff speed disadvantage and cannot escape. In the open seas it can hope that the destroyer needs to keep up with the convoy, or is unwilling to expend its last depth charges once the convoy has moved on. With no convoy to escort and its naval base nearby, a destroyer can take all the time in the world to hunt the sub, and can be relieved once it has spent its depth charges. The sub would be sunk.

And Germany did not have "one or two dozen" submarines to spare in the first place. They would have to be taken from other theaters of operations, completely opening up the North Atlantic for US-GB and US-USSR convois for example.

Blockading Gibraltar with submarines is a non-option tactically, and would not have made sense strategically, given available resources.

DevSolar
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    Another good example is the Battle of Crete. The Germans had air superiority while the British had naval superiority. It did not go well for the Navy. – T.E.D. Jun 14 '16 at 14:51
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    @T.E.D.: Crete didn't go well for the Luftwaffe or the Fallschirmjäger either... I wanted to list cases where the Kriegsmarine -- if not actually ordered to cover land-based operations -- preferred to avoid the RN instead of picking a fight. – DevSolar Jun 14 '16 at 14:53
  • I understand the surface fleets of German and British navy are not comparable. However, I was under the impressions that one or two dozen German submarines could effectively close the Strait of Gibraltar because it's a narrow chokepoint and submarines are not easy to find without first moving into the Strait, at which point the ship(s) would be under torpedo attack already. Can you explain more about why this wouldn't work, with a focus on submarines? – DrZ214 Jun 14 '16 at 16:29
  • @DrZ214: Let's turn this around. What makes you think blockading the Strait of Gibraltar would be of more strategic value than, say, attacking UK- and USSR-bound convoys in the North Atlantic? It's not as if Germany had the "one or two dozen" submarines to spare. Plus, submarines operate on the surface most of the time - where they are easily spotted and attacked if you know they are there. Much easier if placed around the Strait than scattered across the North Atlantic. – DevSolar Jun 14 '16 at 16:34
  • It would be of extreme strategic value if it prevented the allies opening new fronts in Africa, Italy, Greece, or anywhere else on the Mediterranean Coast. Submarines to "spare" is a question depending on many other factors that may or may not require submarines elsewhere. I'm focusing on whether or not this blockade is physically possible and maintainable, and if 20 or so subs can actually hold a blockade given the tech of the time. – DrZ214 Jun 14 '16 at 16:44
  • BTW, a submarine not moving does not have to be surfaced most of the time. One surface per night would be more than enough to replenish oxygen. Periscope depth the rest of the time. A few destroyers in the back for good measure, using naval surface radar so the sub crews do not strain their eyes 24/7. – DrZ214 Jun 14 '16 at 16:45
  • @DrZ214: I seriously doubt it. Any transport that gets stopped would raise a distress call, and destroyers and dive bombers would be on the subs in minutes, not hours. I consider the idea borderline ridiculous, and grasp for a way to make this obvious to you. And any destroyer in the area would be sunk within a day, tops. Blockading means for weeks, months. No chance. – DevSolar Jun 14 '16 at 16:47
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    Given the disparity in strength between the Royal Navy and the German navy, the only way for German to survive for long in the Atlantic was to use hit-and-run tactics. That precludes "A few destroyers in the back for good measure..." U-boats themselves were meant for hit-and-run tactics. Once a U-boat was spotted by the British, it had to flee or die. Parking a bunch of them together in a known piece of sea near a large Naval/Air base would have been suicide. – Gort the Robot Jun 14 '16 at 16:52
  • I consider the idea borderline ridiculous, and grasp for a way to make this obvious to you. Well for better or worse, it's gonna take more than that to make it clear. would be on the subs in minutes Which is why I picked a number like 1 or 2 dozen, all of which can attack independently at the incoming ships. I do not claim to be an expert on submarine warfare. I'm trying to understand why such a narrow waterway cannot be blockaded. To me it seems you just need to match the number of opposing ships that could squeeze in and attack together, which for 14 km seems around 2 dozen subs. – DrZ214 Jun 14 '16 at 16:55
  • @StevenBurnap I guess that's starting to sound more like it, but of course a sub would run after firing (usually a salvo of torpedoes btw). With many subs, it seems to me practically guaranteed that any line of incoming ships would lose a large chunk of its fleet just by trying to enter, then have to pick a few targets, all of whom are scattering and repositioning. Seems like the surface fleet is at a large disadvantage to me. – DrZ214 Jun 14 '16 at 16:59
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    You're talking a war of attrition between the Royal Navy and the German U-boat fleet. This would have ended with a slightly smaller Royal Navy and no German U-boat fleet, which would have resulted in lots of happy convoys coming from the US. You seem to be under the impression that a U-boat was invincible when up against a destroyer. That is far, far from the case. – Gort the Robot Jun 14 '16 at 17:31
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    @DrZ214 Don't overlook the fact that the Brits would also be using aircraft, not just ships, to reopen the straits. In WW II ASW was already a combined arms effort. – KorvinStarmast Jun 21 '16 at 21:58
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While you are at it why not blockade the port of London? Isn't that a better target?
You could come in with 20 subs get 40 kills and go out in a blaze of glory as all the subs are spotted and sunk.

The real reason is air power and counter attacks. Submarines are expensive. If you kill one merchant ship and lose the sub that killed it, it's a net loss for you. The sub needs to kill and live to kill again. WWII subs could only stay underwater for a few hours, could not move very fast, and they have weak armament compared to a surface ship.

Also, the German navy was too weak to win a confrontation with the Royal navy, so subs had to rely on hit and run.

Airplanes are a real problem because they can race to the area of an attack and have enough range they can find the sub and start bombing it.
The allies deliberately bent their supply lines north to keep the merchant ships under air cover from Greenland and Iceland as long as possible since subs normally attacked during gaps in air cover.

sdrawkcabdear
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    Blockading Port of London, even if successful, accomplishes nothing as there are 4+ other big ports at Britain. Blockading Strait of Gibraltar would deny the Mediterranean which is a very strategic area as evidenced by allied operations in Africa/Italy/Greece (except the Suez Canal, but to bring a fleet all the way around Africa, and its resupply fleet, would make it 20x slower). – DrZ214 Jun 14 '16 at 20:46
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    @DrZ214 I believe the point was that both are suicide missions. – Schwern Jun 14 '16 at 20:47
  • And forget the Panama Canal too. It's too far and even if successful, doesn't deny anything. US already chose to divide their fleet to fight Japan and Germany at same time, and had major ports to service ships on both coasts. The Atlantic Fleet would continue sailing to/from Britain and Mediterranean. – DrZ214 Jun 14 '16 at 20:47
  • @Schwern That's fine. I'm just explaining why not blockade the port of London? too, plus the comment on the OP. – DrZ214 Jun 14 '16 at 20:48
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    @DrZ214 The Panama Canal is a plausible submarine target. Instead of maintaining a blockade you need only damage the locks and dams with a small and quick strike. Both the Germans (Operation Pelikan) and Japanese (with specially built I-400 submarines) planned such a surprise strike with aircraft flying from submarines. Though, as you correctly point out, by the time the Axis had the ability to attack the Canal its value as a target diminished. – Schwern Jun 14 '16 at 20:51
  • @Schwern That is interesting. Out of curiosity, how long might it take to repair or replace one lock? I imagine if it was hit, a guard fleet would be set up and not let it happen again. – DrZ214 Jun 14 '16 at 20:56
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    The point of my somewhat snarky opening line was that it was a suicide mission, not so much about the stratigec value of the targets. Schwern is right. – sdrawkcabdear Jun 14 '16 at 20:57
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    @DrZ214 The Japanese, probably optimistic, estimate was a successful attack against the Gatun Locks by 10 aircraft each carrying a single 800 kg bomb would put the canal out of action for six months. By 1944 security at the canal had gotten lax since only a conventional surface strike was considered plausible, and surprise was to be achieved by the aircraft attacking from the Atlantic side. Here's a good documentary on the Japanese plan. – Schwern Jun 14 '16 at 21:10
  • @Schwern Yikes, Japan built four of those near the end of the war? Am I under a false impression of Japan's dire resource shortcomings by 1944? – DrZ214 Jun 16 '16 at 12:58
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    @DrZ214 They wanted 18. It's more a testament that Japan didn't realize they had lost and still building strategic offensive weapons late in the war. – Schwern Jun 16 '16 at 16:10
  • @Schwern: Both Japan and Germany shared one thing -- a global-strategic / resource position that made "going defensive" equivalent to forfeit. Since Roosevelt's statement at the 1943 Cassablanca conference, that meant unconditional surrender. Hence the desperate grasping for "Wunderwaffen" that would enable them to go offensive again. – DevSolar Jun 12 '19 at 15:00
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I'm not a historian nor a scholar of sorts, but I was lucky to be at the right place at the right time and found out from one of the most capable people who could answer this question.

I lived in Madrid, Spain in the late 60s, early 70s. My father grew up as a teenage Nazi in WWII. Not his choice but actually my grandfather's. My grandfather wasn't a Nazi either. They were Hungarian and my grandfather had been a professor at the university of Budapest. As the war broke out the Nazis came to him (and I guess others) and offered to take his family to live in Germany if they so wished. My grandfather, a professor in what today would be political science, had a choice of going to Germany or wait for the Russian communists to come and control Hungary. He chose the former. My father out of social pressure grew up loving Hitler till his last days. The German culture was closer to his Austro-Hungarian.

While living in Madrid, he found out that Otto Skorzeny lived literally a stone's throw away from us. I was in high school in those days.

My father invited him over one day. He was old, his hands shook as he smoked. He held his cigarette between his forefinger and thumb with his palm facing up. In this position he brought it to his mouth.

He had written a book, a copy of which he gave to me but wouldn't sign. I was not a Nazi. Skorzeny made a remark then about Hitler not taking Gibraltar. He said Hit!er was not a military trained person. Skorzeny was. Along with him, other people pushed Hitler to control Gibraltar, but in vane. He remarked that a lot of German forces could have been freed to fight elsewhere rather than in Africa. Skorzeny said precisely as questioned above, that control of the entrance to the Mediterranean was a most important point to win the war. Hitler chose not to control the entrance to the Mediterranean. Skorzeny was the most feared man in Europe. He liberated Mussolini, among his other feats.

CGCampbell
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Whitesnake29
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    -1 personal anecdotes, very partially related to the subject, it is more like a comment than an answer. Please participate with answers, what you posted here could fit in a comment, please delete, and get the proper reputation for that. – CsBalazsHungary Jun 15 '16 at 08:11
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    Nice anecdote, but Skorzeny was talking about taking Gibraltar, not blocking the strait from the sea. – DevSolar Jun 15 '16 at 08:11
  • @DevSolar true, but it does shed light on why it wasn't feasible for the Germans to blockade the Straits: without control of Gibraltar it wasn't going to work. – jwenting Jun 15 '16 at 11:05
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    @CsBalazsHungary: But it really is the answer. The med is the key to victory, and Gibraltar is the key to the med by one way or another. – Joshua Jun 15 '16 at 16:13
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    I am absolutely willing to revoke -1 and eventually turn it to +1, if you link or quote a supporting source. What I found about Skorzeny is generally about the war against Britain. Couldn't find Gibraltar reference. – CsBalazsHungary Jun 16 '16 at 12:08
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    @CsBalazsHungary +1 for two reasons: It's related enough to the strategic underpinnings of my question, plus it's not just any anecdote, it's firsthand witness of Otto Skorzeny! And second, I can remember when joining SE how frustrated an unfair it felt to post an answer, then watch people comment/debate it and not being able to participate in that discussion! Cannot understand that rule. There are automatic spam algorithms available if that's the concern. At the very least, users who post an answer should be able to comment on their own post regardless of rep! +1 to help him out. – DrZ214 Jun 16 '16 at 13:04
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    @DrZ214 This is a tad derailing, but users can always comment on their own posts (check out the [help] ;)). – Jan Jun 17 '16 at 23:07
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Blockade requires local superiority

To enforce a blockade at a chokepoint, you need to arrive there and stay there, winning any engagements. To win local engagements, you need to be stronger than an expected blockade-breaking force. WW2 Germany simply could not do that.

A blockade, no matter if it is done by a handful of subs, or a handful of destroyers, or the whole Kriegsmarine, would result in arrival of a superior British navy force and loss of the involved German ships without much benefit. The German naval weakness meant that their main option was commerce raiding by unpredictable surprise attacks that avoid confrontation with UK navy, and the British goal was to try and force a confrontation to eliminate their ships as German ability to replace them was very limited.

If there was a known location to encounter German ships such as a blockade of Gibraltar, then the British navy would be very happy to take on this offer.

Peteris
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The Germans lost 10 destroyers in the naval battles surrounding the conquest of Norway in 1940. These losses represented half of the modern destroyers constructed by Germany after WWI. It took Germany several years to construct replacement vessels.

A blockade of Gibraltar would have been difficult to maintain without the involvement of neutral Spain to the north and Spanish Morocco to the south. With no air cover, any German vessels patrolling the Straits would have been sitting ducks for the British forces either in the Mediterranean or the eastern Atlantic Ocean.

user16622
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Many folks forget Great Britain had a very formidable submarine force in World War 2 too. What made U-Boats such a menace was the Fall of France and the opening of the Ports of Brittany to the Kreigsmarine. This opened up the Atlantic but not the Med as there were and in fact still are three entrances to the Med... Gibraltar, Suez and the Bosporus. Germany had alliances with Spain, Italy and Turkey therefore Great Britain with whom she was at War with on her own posed no threat to the 3rd Reich after the Fall of France in 1940.

Doctor Zhivago
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